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IN THE MATTER OF EX PARTE RESTRAINING ORDERS, INJUNCTIONS AND WRITS
OF NE EXEAT IN DIVORCE CASES
By George F. Dunklee, PresidingJudge, District Court
HEN I became presiding judge on January 12, 1932,
was struck by an unusually large number of ex parte
applications for restraining orders and writs of ne
exeat in divorce cases.
The first one issued was ex parte upon application based
on allegations of the complaint and an affidavit. The next
morning the defendant appeared and showed that he was living
at home, regularly employed, and it was plain there was no
justification for the plaintiff asking such extraordinary relief.
Plaintiff's attorney consented that the order be set aside.
Applications for similar orders were made frequently and
I took a stand not to issue them on affidavits alone and required the plaintiff to come into court, take the stand and
testify. In practically all cases the court was satisfied, from
the evidence, that there was no necessity for any such order.
I had the Clerk make a search of the records for the
purpose of ascertaining about how many ex parte restraining
orders and writs of ne exeat had been issued in the past seven
years and found that in: 1925, 77; 1926, 88; 1927, 98; 1928,
132; 1929, 118; 1930, 104; 1931, 67; 1932, 3, since January
12th to date, April 9th, including one set aside as above stated.
I looked up the authorities, first, as to the authority of
the courts to issue such ex parte orders; and second, as to the
public policy of the court issuing them without notice ex parte.
It is elementary civil code practice law that, "Every
direction of the court or judge, made or entered in writing,
and not included in a judgment, is denominated an order.
An application for an order is a motion." (Sec. 406, C. Code,
C. L. 1921.)
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"Written notice of motions shall be required in all cases, except those
made during the progress of the trial." (Sec. 407 Civil Code, C. L. 1921.)

That brings us to a question of an exception to the above
provisions of the Code, if any, or of the inherent common-law
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power of the court, if any, in such cases, to disregard the
giving of notice and bond.
The case of Sedgwick v. Sedgwick, 50 Colo. 167, deals
with temporary injunctions and restraining orders without
notice, and on pages 167 and 168 the court says (quoting from
Sec. 165 of the Code, C. L. 1921):
"In the event the temporary restraining order shall issue without notice
and it shall afterwards appear to the court, upon any hearing or trial of said
matter, that the emergency alleged therefor did not exist, or, existing, was
brought about by the act or omission of or for the plaintiff, or by his knowledge, the court shall find and enter judgment accordingly, and shall, also,
dismiss the complaint without respect to the merits thereof, and shall, also,
summarily enter judgment on said emergency bond for the defendant and
against the plaintiff and his sureties aforesaid, and issue execution therefor."

Page 168:
"It is claimed under this statute, the trial court erred in not dismissing
the complaint. The claim is wrong, for the simple reason counsel did not ask
to have it dismissed. If counsel wanted the action dismissed upon a hearing
of 'said matter,' they should have called it to the attention of the court and
had it heard. 'Said matter,' does not refer to the principal suit, but to the
issuing of the restraining order. This not to be construed as implying that
the code provision on injunction is applicable to divorce actions. Whether
the district court possesses inherent common-law power to issue restraining
orders in proper cases, in divorce actions, without notice and without bond,
we express no opinion."

At least that decision leaves the legal propriety of issuing
such orders in doubt.
In the case of In re Nash, 62 Colo. 101, on the question
of "ne exeat," it says among other things:
"Scope of the Writ, has not been enlarged by the code," etc.

A practice and custom has been built up by plaintiff
coming into court ex parte with stock allegations in complaints
and affidavits and getting these extraordinary orders as a matter of course in cases where the husband and wife are at the
time of the filing of the suit living together in the same house,
and the fact of the issuance of these extraordinary and harsh
orders brings about a condition between the husband and wife
whereby there can be no reconciliation.
I am of the opinion that ex parte injunction orders not
issued if at all without notice, until the Supreme Court holds

DICTA

otherwise, except the court upon an examination of the plaintiff, not on affidavit or complaint alone, is convinced of a
critical condition which would call for the extraordinary
powers of the court to protect the plaintiff.
Among the authorities I cite the following:
"Since it is ex parte, and it is 'a remedy of great severity, it is applied
to private rights with great caution and jealousy,' and will not ordinarily be
granted when the equity is doubtful, nor as a means of improper restraint."
2 Story Equity Practice, p. 801 ; also 45 C. J. 590.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF COLORADO
N order that the Supreme Court may expedite its work, it
has been divided into three departments instead of two,
pursuant to the authority of the Constitution. This means
that the Chief Justice and two associates constitute a department. Such was the practice until a few years ago, but afterwards two departments were established. Of course should
any member of a department disagree with his associates, then
the case is considered by the court en banc. Cases involving
constitutional questions and capital cases are heard by the
court en banc, as well as other cases when so directed by the
court.
The three departments as announced by the court Monday
are constituted as follows:
Department One:

Mr. Chief Justice Adams

Mr. Justice Campbell

Mr. Justice Alter
Department Two:
Mr. Chief Justice Adams

Mr. Justice Butler

Mr. Justice Moore
Department Three:

Mr. Chief Justice Adams
Mr. Justice Burke
Mr. Justice Hilliard

